Expires in six months by Paul Hoffman & Marc Blanchet
Internet Draft                                          Paul Hoffman 
draft-ietf-idn-nameprep-07.txt                            IMC & VPNC 
January 9, 2001                                        Marc Blanchet 
Expires in six months                                       ViaGenie 
 
        Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Host Names 
 
Status of this memo 
 
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all 
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. 
 
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups 
may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. 
 
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material 
or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 
 
To view the list Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see 
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This document describes how to prepare internationalized host name 
parts in order to increase the likelihood that name input and name 
comparison work in ways that make sense for typical users throughout 
the world. This profile of the stringprep protocol is used as part of a 
suite of on-the-wire protocols for internationalizing the DNS. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This document specifies processing rules that will allow users to enter 
internationalized host name parts in applications and have the highest 
chance of getting the content of the strings correct. It is a profile 
of stringprep [STRINGPREP]. 
 
This document was previously called "nameprep" before splitting the 
structure of the protocol off into the stringprep document. 
 
This profile defines the following, as required by [STRINGPREP] 
 
- The intended applicability of the profile: internationalized 
host name parts 
 
- The character repertoire that is the input and output to stringprep: 
defined in Section 2 
 
- The list of unassigned code points for the repertoire: defined 
in Appendix F. 
 
- The mappings used: defined in Section 3. 
 
- The Unicode normalization used: defined in Section 4  
- The characters that are prohibited as output: Defined in section 5 
 
 
1.2 Terminology 
 
The key words "MUST", "SHALL", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and 
"MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 
[RFC2119]. 
 
Examples in this document use the notation for code points and names 
from the Unicode Standard [Unicode3.1] and ISO/IEC 10646 [ISO10646]. 
For example, the letter "a" may be represented as either "U+0061" or 
"LATIN SMALL LETTER A". In the lists of prohibited characters, the "U+" 
is left off to make the lists easier to read. The comments for 
character ranges are shown in square brackets (such as "[SYMBOLS]") and 
do not come from the standards. 
 
 
2. Character Repertoire 
 
Unicode 3.1 [Unicode3.1] is the repertoire used in this profile. 
The reason Unicode 3.1 was chosen instead of a version of 
ISO/IEC 10646 is that ISO/IEC 10646 is expected to be updated soon 
after this document becomes an RFC. Unicode 3.1 has the exact 
repertoire that is expected in the next version of ISO/IEC 10646, and 
is therefore used here. 
 
 
3. Mapping 
 
This profile specifies stringprep mapping using the mapping table 
in Appendix D. That table includes all the steps described in this 
section. 
 
Note that text in this section describe how Appendix D was formed. It 
is there for people who want to understand more, but it should be 
ignored by implementors. Implementations of this profile MUST map based 
on Appendix D, not based on the descriptions in this section of how 
Appendix D was created. 
 
3.1 Mapped out 
 
The following characters are simply deleted from the input (that is, 
they are mapped to nothing) because their presence or absence should 
not make two strings different. 
 
Some characters are only useful in line-based text, and are otherwise 
invisible and ignored. 
 
00AD; SOFT HYPHEN 
1806; MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN 
200B; ZERO WIDTH SPACE 
FEFF; ZERO WIDTH NO-BREAK SPACE 
 
Variation selectors and cursive connectors select different glyphs, but 
do not bear semantics.  
180B; MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR ONE 
180C; MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR TWO 
180D; MONGOLIAN FREE VARIATION SELECTOR THREE 
200C; ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER 
200D; ZERO WIDTH JOINER 
 
3.2 Case mapping 
 
The input string is case folded according to [UTR21]. For most 
characters, this is the same as changing the input character to a 
lowercase character. For some characters, however, more complex 
transformations occur. The "CaseFolding.txt" file from the Unicode 
database was used to prepare the mapping table. 
 
There are some characters that do not have mappings in [UTR21] but 
still need processing. These characters include a few Greek characters 
and many symbols that contain Latin characters. The list of characters 
to add to the mapping table were determined by the following algorithm: 
 
b = NormalizeWithKC(Fold(a)); 
c = NormalizeWithKC(Fold(b)); 
if c is not the same as b, add a mapping for "a to c". 
 
Because NormalizeWithKC(Fold(c)) always equals c, the table is stable 
from that point on. The "DerivedNormalizationProperties.txt" file from 
the Unicode database was used to prepare Appendix D. This mapping was 
added to reduce the number of processing steps, that is, to avoid doing 
case mapping and normalization twice. 
 
 
4. Normalization 
 
This profile specifies using Unicode normalization form KC, as 
described in [UAX15]. 
 
 
5. Prohibited Output 
 
This profile specifies using the prohibition table in Appendix E. 
 
Note that the subsections below describe how Appendix E was formed. 
They are there for people who want to understand more, but they should 
be ignored by implementors. Implementations of this profile MUST map 
based on Appendix E, not based on the descriptions in this section of 
how Appendix E was created. 
 
The collected lists of prohibited code points can be found in Appendix 
E of this document. The lists in Appendix E MUST be used by 
implementations of this specification. If there are any discrepancies 
between the lists in Appendix E and subsections below, the lists in 
Appendix E always takes precedence. 
 
Some code points listed in one section would also appear in other 
sections. Each code point is only listed once in the tables in Appendix 
E. 
 5.1 Space characters 
 
Space characters would make visual transcription of URLs nearly 
impossible and could lead to user entry errors in many ways. 
 
0020; SPACE 
00A0; NO-BREAK SPACE 
1680; OGHAM SPACE MARK 
2000; EN QUAD 
2001; EM QUAD 
2002; EN SPACE 
2003; EM SPACE 
2004; THREE-PER-EM SPACE 
2005; FOUR-PER-EM SPACE 
2006; SIX-PER-EM SPACE 
2007; FIGURE SPACE 
2008; PUNCTUATION SPACE 
2009; THIN SPACE 
200A; HAIR SPACE 
202F; NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE 
3000; IDEOGRAPHIC SPACE 
 
5.2 Control characters 
 
Control characters (or characters with control function) cannot be seen 
and can cause unpredictable results when displayed. 
 
0000-001F; [CONTROL CHARACTERS] 
007F; DELETE 
0080-009F; [CONTROL CHARACTERS] 
070F; SYRIAC ABBREVIATION MARK 
180E; MONGOLIAN VOWEL SEPARATOR 
2028; LINE SEPARATOR 
2029; PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR 
206A-206F; [CONTROL CHARACTERS] 
FFF9-FFFC; [CONTROL CHARACTERS] 
1D173-1D17A; [MUSICAL CONTROL CHARACTERS] 
 
5.3 Private use and replacement characters 
 
Because private-use characters do not have defined meanings, they are 
prohibited. The private-use characters are: 
 
E000-F8FF; [PRIVATE USE, PLANE 0] 
F0000-FFFFD; [PRIVATE USE, PLANE 15] 
100000-10FFFD; [PRIVATE USE, PLANE 16] 
 
The replacement character (U+FFFD) has no known semantic definition in 
a name, and is often displayed by renderers to indicate "there would be 
some character here, but it cannot be rendered". For example, on a 
computer with no Asian fonts, a name with three ideographs might be 
rendered with three replacement characters. 
 
FFFD; REPLACEMENT CHARACTER 
 
5.4 Non-character code points 
 Non-character code points are code points that have been allocated in 
ISO/IEC 10646 but are not characters. Because they are already 
assigned, they are guaranteed not to later change into characters. 
 
FDD0-FDEF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
FFFE-FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
1FFFE-1FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
2FFFE-2FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
3FFFE-3FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
4FFFE-4FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
5FFFE-5FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
6FFFE-6FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
7FFFE-7FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
8FFFE-8FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
9FFFE-9FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
AFFFE-AFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
BFFFE-BFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
CFFFE-CFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
DFFFE-DFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
EFFFE-EFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
FFFFE-FFFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
10FFFE-10FFFF; [NONCHARACTER CODE POINTS] 
 
The non-character code points are listed the PropList.txt file from the 
Unicode database. 
 
5.5 Surrogate codes 
 
The following code points are permanently reserved for use as surrogate 
code values in the UTF-16 encoding, will never be assigned to 
characters, and are therefore prohibited: 
 
D800-DFFF; [SURROGATE CODES] 
 
5.6 Inappropriate for plain text 
 
The following characters should not appear in regular text. 
 
FFF9; INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION ANCHOR 
FFFA; INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION SEPARATOR 
FFFB; INTERLINEAR ANNOTATION TERMINATOR 
FFFC; OBJECT REPLACEMENT CHARACTER 
 
5.7 Inappropriate for canonical representation 
 
The ideographic description characters allow different sequences of 
characters to be rendered the same way, which makes them inappropriate 
for host names that must have a single canonical representation. 
 
2FF0-2FFB; [IDEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION CHARACTERS] 
 
5.8 Change display properties 
 
The following characters, some of which are deprecated in ISO/IEC 
10646, can cause changes in display or the order in which characters 
appear when rendered. 
 200E; LEFT-TO-RIGHT MARK 
200F; RIGHT-TO-LEFT MARK 
202A; LEFT-TO-RIGHT EMBEDDING 
202B; RIGHT-TO-LEFT EMBEDDING 
202C; POP DIRECTIONAL FORMATTING 
202D; LEFT-TO-RIGHT OVERRIDE 
202E; RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE 
206A; INHIBIT SYMMETRIC SWAPPING 
206B; ACTIVATE SYMMETRIC SWAPPING 
206C; INHIBIT ARABIC FORM SHAPING 
206D; ACTIVATE ARABIC FORM SHAPING 
206E; NATIONAL DIGIT SHAPES 
206F; NOMINAL DIGIT SHAPES 
 
5.9 Inappropriate characters from common input mechanisms 
 
U+3002 is used as if it were U+002E in many input mechanisms, 
particularly in Asia. This prohibition allows input mechanisms to 
safely map U+3002 to U+002E before doing stringprep without worrying 
about preventing users from accessing legitimate host name parts. 
 
3002; IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP 
 
5.10 Tagging characters 
 
The following characters are used for tagging text and are invisible. 
 
E0001; LANGUAGE TAG 
E0020-E007F; [TAGGING CHARACTERS] 
 
 
6. Unassigned Code Points in Internationalized Host Names 
 
This profile lists the unassigned code points for Unicode 3.1 in 
Appendix F. The list in Appendix F MUST be used by implementations of 
this specification. If there are any discrepancies between the list in 
Appendix F and the Unicode 3.1 specification, the list Appendix F 
always takes precedence. 
 
 
7. Security Considerations 
 
ISO/IEC 10646 has many characters that look similar. In many cases, 
users of security protocols might do visual matching, such as when 
comparing the names of trusted third parties. This profile does nothing 
to map similar-looking characters together. 
 
Much of the security of the Internet relies on the DNS. Thus, any 
change to the characteristics of the DNS can change the security of 
much of the Internet. 
 
Host names are used by users to connect to Internet servers. The 
security of the Internet would be compromised if a user entering a 
single internationalized name could be connected to different servers 
based on different interpretations of the internationalized host name. 
 
Current applications may assume that the characters allowed in host names will always be the same as they are in [STD13]. This document 
vastly increases the number of characters available in host names. 
Every program that uses "special" characters in conjunction with host 
names may be vulnerable to attack based on the new characters allowed 
by this specification. 
 
 
8. References 
 
[CharModel] Unicode Technical Report;17, Character Encoding Model. 
<http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr17/>. 
 
[Glossary] Unicode Glossary, <http://www.unicode.org/glossary/>. 
 
[ISO10646] ISO/IEC 10646-1:2000. International Standard -- Information 
technology -- Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) – Part 
1: Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane. 
 
[RFC2119] Scott Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
Requirement Levels", March 1997, RFC 2119. 
 
[STD13] Paul Mockapetris, "Domain names - concepts and facilities" (RFC 
1034) and "Domain names - implementation and specification" (RFC 1035, 
STD 13, November 1987. 
 
[STRINGPREP] Paul Hoffman and Marc Blanchet, "Preparation of 
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", draft-hoffman-stringprep, 
work in progress 
 
[Unicode3.1] The Unicode Standard, Version 3.1.0: The Unicode 
Consortium. The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0. Reading, MA, 
Addison-Wesley Developers Press, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5, as amended 
by: Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1 
<http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr27/tr27-4.html>. 
 
[URI] For example: Roy Fielding et al., "Uniform Resource Identifiers: 
Generic Syntax", August 1998, RFC 2396; Robert Hinden et. al, "IPv6 
Literal Addresses in URL's", December 1999, RFC 2732. Note that 
there are many other RFCs that define additional URI schemes. 
 
[UAX15] Mark Davis and Martin Duerst. Unicode Standard Annex #15: 
Unicode Normalization Forms, Version 3.1.0. 
<http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr15/tr15-21.html> 
 
[UTR21] Mark Davis. Case Mappings. Unicode Technical Report;21. 
<http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr21/>. 
 
 
9. Differences Between -06 and -07 Drafts 
 
5: Removed 5.1 (currently-used ASCII characters) and renumbered 
the entire section. 
 
E: Removed the characters that appeared in the old 5.1. 
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B. IANA Considerations 
 
This is a profile of stringprep. When it becomes an RFC, it 
should be registered in the stringprep profile registry. 
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